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THE SECRET SAUCE OF BALLOT INITIATIVE
APPROVAL: ELIMINATING ISSUES WITHIN
ARKANSAS’S PRE-CIRCULATION REVIEW
Nancy Smith
I. INTRODUCTION
As Justice Thurgood Marshall once said, “Where you see
wrong or inequality or injustice, speak out, because this is your
country. This is your democracy. Make it. Protect it. Pass it
on.”1 Democracy is essential to the American political system.
Direct democracy, however, exists in only twenty-four states.2
Known as citizen lawmaking, direct democracy allows citizens to
place constitutional amendments and statutes on statewide ballots
without legislative support or intervention.3 It places power
directly into the hands of citizens through a petition process that
cumulates in voters making the ultimate decision.4
In order to ensure that voters are presented with welldeveloped proposals, many states require a review of the initiative
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process, Amanda Hurst, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law,
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1. Mashaun D. Simon, ‘Moral Authority’: How Justice Thurgood Marshall
Transformed Society, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2017, 12:47 PM), [https://perma.cc/4T5KYW4B].
2. M. DANE WATERS, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 12 (2d ed. 2018).
3. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION
3-4 (1989). In comparison, the indirect initiative process allows citizens to submit proposals
to their state legislature. WATERS, supra note 2, at 14. If not adopted, the proposal is usually
then placed on the general election ballot. Id..
4. See Jay Barth, By the Numbers: Direct Democracy Across Time, ARK. TIMES (July
11, 2012), [https://perma.cc/3NKB-VRS5].
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that results in either initiative certification or rejection. 5 This
review occurs before initiative petitioners circulate a proposal
across a state to gather the number of signatures required for an
initiative to go on a ballot.6 It is the first major step in voters
adopting a proposal.7 This mandatory review usually occurs at
the hands of either an elected official, appointed individual, or a
group of reviewers.8 In Arkansas, direct democracy requires: (1)
a pre-circulation review that utilizes a single elected official to
conduct a review based on adequate filing; and (2) a multi-person
post-circulation review for ballot language that may confuse
voters.9
Imagine raising $9.8 million in support of a ballot
initiative.10 That number represents how much committees raised
in support of an Arkansas initiative that would authorize four new
casinos. 11 Now imagine having such vast resources but being
stopped from utilizing direct democracy and presenting that
initiative to voters due to a reviewer’s subjective opinion. That is
exactly what happened to the casino initiative proposal five
different times.12 Before the Attorney General’s pre-circulation
language review was replaced with a post-circulation review by
the Arkansas Board of Election Commissioners,13 the casino
initiative was continually rejected because the Attorney General’s
decision-making authority during the language review was vague
and opened-ended. Furthermore, in the 2018 election cycle alone,
the Attorney General rejected sixty-three proposed initiatives.14
Although the standard is outlined in the state’s statutory code,15
5. WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 14, 18.
8. See Logan T. Mohs, Alaska’s Initiative Process: The Benefits of Advance Oversight
and a Recommendation for Change, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 295, 302-03 (2014).
9. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-9-107, -111 (2019).
10. See Michael R. Wickline, Arkansas Casino Backers Spent $9.7M, Files Show,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Dec. 16, 2018), [https://perma.cc/XWK5-2JHX].
11. Id.
12. Michael R. Wickline, Ballot Title Still Faulty, State Attorney General Says in 5th
Rejection of Casinos Proposal, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (May 10, 2018, 4:30 AM),
[https://perma.cc/7HBM-DB74].
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(3).
14. David Ramsey, Attorney General Leslie Rutledge Rejects Proposed Ballot
Initiative to Raise Minimum Wage to $12, ARK. TIMES (May 5, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/LH6S-3W9C].
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(3).
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the discretion given to the Attorney General, and now the
Arkansas Board of Election Commissioners, to reject initiatives
for language that may mislead voters is overly broad and openended. It was not until the casino initiative’s petitioners sued the
Attorney General and garnered Arkansas Supreme Court
intervention that the initiative was approved.16 If no such
recourse had been available to the petitioners following repeated
rejection, even when the language was not misleading, the time
and money spent to support the casino measure would have been
wasted.
Pre- and post-circulation reviews can destroy a ballot
initiative. A single decision-maker or small group of reviewers
decides whether voters will have the opportunity to participate in
direct democracy or be forced to wait for legislative action.17
While this review eliminates confusing proposals so that voters
understand what they are voting for or against, the review
standard must be clear. Due to the open-ended statutory mandate
that gives the Arkansas Board of Election Commissioners
discretionary power over initiative rejection decisions only after
signatures are gathered, the Arkansas review process should
return to a pre-circulation review and incorporate additional
standards of approval.
This Comment offers pre-circulation review options that
state governments can use to assess the status of their own
processes. Part II of this Comment analyzes direct democracy
generally, examines how state governments utilize pre-circulation
review, and analyzes Arkansas’s pre-circulation review issues.
Part III examines two pre-circulation review models; the three
types of reviewers who conduct the reviews; and how, when taken
together, they can give state governments a way to assess which
combination provides the best pre-circulation review to fit their
needs. Part IV concludes by summarizing how states can take
into account the various structure combinations to improve their
own processes and provides an alternative to Arkansas’s current
pre- and post-circulation review system.

16. Rachel Herzog & John Moritz, Arkansas Attorney General Approves 4 Ballot
Measures Hours After High Court’s Ruling, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (May 23, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/E3YD-C7CA].
17. See Mohs, supra note 8, at 302-03.
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II. BACKGROUND
Because direct democracy is a powerful force in states with
such provisions, understanding its background is necessary. All
mandatory, controlling reviews may face problems that must be
addressed in order to ensure a fair application of direct
democracy.
A. Direct Democracy in the United States
While direct democracy puts legislative power directly into
the hands of citizens, special interest groups who financially
support proposals that further their own agendas often control the
direct democracy process.18 In response, legislators often fight
back by tightening direct democracy provisions to alleviate the
tension between supporting direct democracy and furthering
special interests, thus making it harder for any proposals to pass
review and signature gathering phases.19
1. History of Direct Democracy
The United States Constitution does not guarantee direct
democracy.20 Unlike certain areas of state law, the ballot
initiative process in American states is not a reflection of the
federal government.21 Rather than individual citizens proposing
and making laws, elected representatives serve that role.22 The
Constitution does not require states to provide an initiative
process, nor do American citizens have a First Amendment right
to place initiatives on ballots.23 Our Nation’s founders viewed

18. Caroline J. Tolbert, Public Policy and Direct Democracy in the Twentieth Century:
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN
LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 35, 36 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001).
19. Paul Jacob, Silence Isn’t Golden: The Legislative Assault on Citizen Initiatives, in
THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 97 (M. Dane Waters
ed., 2001).
20. Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 892 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2018).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 295-97 (6th
Cir. 1993); Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012); Molinari v. Bloomberg,
564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009).
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direct democracy as a path to political instability and
factionalism; thus, it is absent at the federal level.24
A ballot measure is any ballot item that does not pertain to a
candidate running for office.25 The initiative process is defined
as “a process by which voters may propose statewide or local
legislative measures or acts and statewide amendments to the
Constitution.”26 More simply, initiatives are “the popular
creation of a new law or amendment.”27 Because direct
democracy places average citizens on equal footing with elected
officials, it can appropriately be described as a state government’s
fourth branch.28
The first proposal to give citizens this power was introduced
in 1885, followed by South Dakota’s adoption of a statewide
initiative process in 1898.29 An important argument used in the
push for direct democracy was that it would strengthen
representative government by adding an “external check” on state
legislatures.30 Because the process was a flexible way to fight
congressional takeover by special interest groups, citizens saw it
as a way to directly propose binding solutions to their society’s
problems.31
Over a series of forty-seven elections in thirty-two states,
Americans decided whether to adopt direct democracy in their
own states.32 Over half of those voting states approved adding a
provision, with the last adoption occurring in Rhode Island in
1996.33 Today, around 203 million people have the ability to use
ballot initiatives to enact change, and seventy percent of

24. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
25. WATERS, supra note 2, at 12.
26. MARK MARTIN, 2017-18 INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA: FACTS AND
INFORMATION FOR THE 2018 GENERAL ELECTION 3 (2018), [https://perma.cc/KGS7NBQB].
27. Steve Sheppard, Intelligible, Honest, and Impartial Democracy: Making Laws at
the Arkansas Ballot Box, or Why Jim Hannah and Ray Thornton Were Right About May v.
Daniels, 2005 ARK. L. NOTES 123, 124 (2005).
28. Jessica A. Levinson, Taking the Initiative: How to Save Direct Democracy, 18
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1020, 1020-21 (2014).
29. SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 5, 7; WATERS, supra note 2, at xix.
30. RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING
THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2004).
31. Id.
32. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 5-6.
33. Id. at 6.
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Americans approve of direct democracy.34 Since the first
statewide initiative made it on a ballot in 1904, over 2900
measures have been voted on across the country.35 Of those
nearly 3000 proposals, forty percent have passed.36 Since 1989,
over 600 state laws or constitutional amendments have been
adopted as a direct result of ballot initiatives.37
2. The Rationales for Direct Democracy
Direct democracy embodies the American mantra
“government of the people, by the people, for the people.”38 It
essentially allows the public to determine for themselves what is
in the public interest.39 Direct democracy gives recourse to
citizens experiencing voter frustration even when traditional
democracy methods are failing,40 like when lawmakers disregard
the reforms and policies that their constituents are passionate
about.41 No matter if a state is experiencing congressional
gridlock or partisan polarization, voters can still act by initiating
their own ballot measures.42
Initiatives are a strong force driving the policy agenda within
state governments and are often used by voters to deal with
pressing social issues. 43 For example, citizen initiatives created
proposals that gave women the right to vote, enacted
environmental protections, abolished poll taxes, and created the
eight-hour workday.44 More recently, initiatives have dealt with
34. Mohs, supra note 8, at 296; John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 185, 186 (2005).
35. WATERS, supra note 2, at 8.
36. Id.
37. SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 26.
38. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863),
[https://perma.cc/9BZS-NGY3].
39. SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 25.
40. See Suzanne M. Fitch, Citizen Ballot Initiatives to Amend the Illinois Constitution,
29 DCBA BRIEF 14, 14 (2017); John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend
State Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of
Participatory Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227, 268 (1998).
41. See M. Dane Waters, The Elephant in the Room, TIPPING POINT STRATEGIES (Sept.
19, 2017), [https://perma.cc/HJ4X-BPY3]; Vann R. Newkirk II, American Voters Are
Turning to Direct Democracy, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2018), [https://perma.cc/KY7VZZRN].
42. Newkirk II, supra note 41.
43. See Matsusaka, supra note 34, at 185; BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 143.
44. WATERS, supra note 2, at 7.

2019

THE SECRET SAUCE

689

issues surrounding convicted criminal rights; bilingual education;
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ)
community; the right to die; and affirmative action.45
Even when state officials oppose a ballot measure, they must
respect voter decisions and uphold passed initiatives. For
example, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson did not support the
initiative that granted four additional casino gaming licenses in
certain Arkansas counties.46 However, once the initiative passed,
Governor Hutchinson responded by stating that “the people have
spoken, and I respect their will.”47
Direct democracy creates government accountability.48 By
giving citizens direct power, it prevents the risk of control by a
sole entity, such as a state legislature, and is an additional check
on government power.49 And, even when initiatives do not pass,
citizens are able to garner interest and create public discussion on
topics not usually considered by their representatives.50
3. The Costs of Direct Democracy
Direct democracy has continually faced adversity.51 Those
who oppose the citizen power to pass legislation and
constitutional amendments do so for a variety of reasons. 52 One
major critique of direct democracy is that financially powerful
special interest groups control the process.53 Because direct
democracy bypasses a state legislature, no whipping of votes or
lobbying efforts play a role in whether a vote is cast for or against
a ballot initiative.54 However, initiatives backed by special
interest groups with vast economic and election-related resources
bring that same persuasive action seen inside the legislature to

45. BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 143.
46. Michael R. Wickline, Casino Measure Wins Arkansas Voters’ Support, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 7, 2018), [https://perma.cc/FP5V-D6U5].
47. Id.
48. See SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 26.
49. Id at 29.
50. BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 141.
51. See SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 4.
52. See id. at 34.
53. Tolbert, supra note 18, at 36.
54. See id. at 38.
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individual citizens.55 As demonstrated through the Arkansas
casino initiative,56 these groups raise large sums to push their
initiative forward. Such involvement lessens the chance that
initiatives brought by petitioners who rely on word-of-mouth and
grassroots efforts will be successful.57 Thus, those special interest
groups often control what initiatives are passed through their
marketing labors.58 Another critique is that direct democracy
allows citizens to unfairly draft laws and dictate important policy
decisions, rather than the men and women elected to serve in that
capacity.59
If a state’s pre-circulation review process does not include
review of the language’s content, uninformed voters may
unknowingly pass an initiative that imposes serious consequences
on their way of life.60 Unfortunately, such a vote may likely be
the result of a powerful group whose initiative succeeds merely
because of their expensive marketing campaign.61 As a result,
even though direct democracy was created as an additional check
on the legislative branch, legislators often attack such provisions
through increased regulation.62 These regulations lengthen the
process, making it harder for citizens to implement legislation
without using the normal political methods.63 Such attacks often
arise when citizens contemplate proposing changes to the
legislative branch organization, such as term limits or

55. See id. at 36; see also Daniel A. Smith, Special Interests and Direct Democracy:
An Historical Glance, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS 59, 59 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001).
56. Wickline, supra note 10.
57. See Crystal Ayres, 19 Pros and Cons of Direct Democracy, VITTANA PERSONAL
FINANCE BLOG, [https://perma.cc/U3Z3-XSWC] (last visited Sept. 3, 2019); see also
Tolbert, supra note 18, at 36.
58. See Smith, supra note 55, at 60-61. But see Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R.
Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects and
Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS 73, 90-91 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001) (concluding that large contributions by
interest groups are often successful in defeating initiatives but much less successful in
passing them).
59. See Tolbert, supra note 18, at 35-36.
60. Ayres, supra note 57.
61. Id.
62. Paul Jacob, Silence Isn’t Golden: The Legislative Assault on Citizen Initiatives, in
THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 97, 97 (M. Dane
Waters ed., 2001).
63. See id. at 97-98.
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redistricting.64 Changes to the initiative process brought by
legislators often manifest through increased signature
requirements, shortened timelines for approval, and redefined
single-subject rules.65 These limitations greatly decrease a
citizen’s ability to effectively utilize direct democracy because
they make the process more difficult.66
B. Pre-Circulation Review
Pre-circulation review is often the first, major step in direct
democracy.67 While each state that requires this review differs in
its execution, reviews likely safeguard against any unfair balance
of power within the process. However, pre-circulation review
slows down a proposal’s development and often gives too much
discretionary power to the elected official, appointed individual,
or group of individuals who guide the process.
1. The Role of Pre-Circulation Review in Direct Democracy
For the seven states that require a pre-circulation review
within their direct democracy provision, that review is the most
important step in the entire process.68 A direct democracy process
usually adheres to the following structure.69 First, proponents of
an initiative draft a ballot proposal that must be approved by the
designated reviewer.70 Once certified, states often require the
ballot measure, which generally includes the title and summary,
to be published in a major state newspaper.71 The proposal is then
circulated throughout the state to gain the required number of
signatures.72 Once signatures are submitted and verified, the
initiative is placed on the statewide ballot.73 If passed, the
64. Fitch, supra note 40, at 14.
65. See, e.g., Newkirk II, supra note 41; see also Jacob, supra note 62, at 102-03.
66. See Jacob, supra note 62, at 97-98.
67. WATERS, supra note 2, at 14, 18.
68. See id. at 18-20. Those seven states are unique because they employ direct
democracy, as opposed to indirect democracy, and the pre-circulation review is both
mandatory and binding on the petitioner. Id.
69. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 1023.
70. Id. at 1023.
71. WATERS, supra note 2, at 20-21, 37.
72. Levinson, supra note 28, at 1023.
73. WATERS, supra note 2, at 14.
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initiative becomes the law, either through a constitutional
amendment or statute.74
There are two methods that lead to ballot rejection before
circulation begins. First, initiatives are rejected for the proposal’s
failed adherence to subject limitations.75 Second, initiatives are
rejected for the proposal’s form.76 Each model gives varying
amounts of discretion to the reviewer.77 Thus, the type of
reviewer who makes the rejection or approval decision is
important to consider. Of the seven states that require precirculation review, the decision-maker is either an elected official,
an appointed individual, or an appointed group of people. 78 The
type of reviewer chosen to conduct the pre-circulation review
determines the process’s efficiency, the reviewer’s source of
accountability, and the activity’s equitable value.
Oversight of direct democracy through a review period is
beneficial.79 By designating an elected official, appointing
someone, or giving the power to a group of reviewers, states
safeguard against any unfair balance of power.80 If the judicial
branch oversaw direct democracy, particularly what is contained
within proposals, a citizen’s opportunity to appeal a rejection
would be eliminated.81 A reviewer or group of reviewers who are
independent from the court system and are elected to serve in an
administrative capacity present a unique connection to voters due
to an elected officer’s direct accountability to voters. 82 On the
other hand, an appointed individual or group is not concerned
with the wills of the people and instead may only rely on the
standard of review provided. Thus, the accountability aspect of
direct democracy is determinative upon what type of reviewer is

74. Id. at 12.
75. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 50-51; OKLA. CONST.
art. XXIV, § 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
76. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. III, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-101-01 (2015);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161(3)(a) (2014); MO. ANN.
STAT. §§ 116.030-.040 (2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 9.B (2018).
77. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
78. See id. at 18-20.
79. See Mohs, supra note 8, at 295, 303.
80. Id. at 304.
81. See id. at 305.
82. Id. at 307.
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utilized during pre-circulation review.83 All types of oversight,
however, provide an independent official who is not associated
with lawmaking of any kind, thus further ensuring that direct
democracy allows citizens to bypass legislative bodies
completely.84
2. Issues with Pre-Circulation Review
States undoubtedly use pre-circulation review as an
additional mechanism to control the ballot initiative process.
Each pre-circulation review model empowers the reviewer with
discretion.85 The only difference between each review model is
the level of discretion given to the reviewer, which is best
understood on a continuum.86 The subject adherence review
gives the decision-maker ultimate discretion.87 Because the topic
limitation inherent in subject review restricts the areas of law an
initiative can cover, the reviewer has ability to construe the
language either broadly or narrowly.88 In contrast, the review for
form gives the decision-maker the least amount of discretion.89
Whether an initiative meets the statutory form requirements
involves no amount of subjectivity because the form is either
correct or incorrect.90
Large amounts of discretion create the risk that the discretion
will be abused. The subject review gives such discretion that the
reviewer alone decides whether an initiative will be given to the
voters or not.91 While such discretion included in this review
model may not be mistreated, the possibility still exists. By
reducing the amount of discretion, as demonstrated in the form

83. BARRY C. BURDEN, ET AL., COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED ELECTION
OFFICIALS: THE IMPACT OF SELECTION METHOD ON POLICY PREFERENCES AND
ADMINISTRATIVE OUTCOMES 4 (Mar. 22, 2010), [https://perma.cc/M9VZ-ZAPX].
84. See Mohs, supra note 8, at 302-03, 308.
85. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
86. See id.
87. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MO. CONST. art. III, § 50; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
88. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MO. CONST. art. III, § 50; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
89. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
90. See id.
91. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MO. CONST. art. III, § 50; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1,
cl. 4.
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review,92 states lessen that possibility. Without any personal
influence of the reviewer, the decision to approve or reject an
initiative is solely dependent on whether the initiative’s
petitioners followed the statutory guidelines.93
The less
discretion, the smaller the likelihood of the reviewer’s own
agenda affecting the approval process.
C. Direct Democracy in Arkansas
Arkansas has provided its citizens the power of direct
democracy for over one hundred years.94 The process currently
requires: (1) pre-circulation review by an elected official who
rejects ballot proposals for adherence to filing requirements; and
(2) a post-circulation review by an appointed group of individuals
who review for language that may mislead or confuse voters. 95
1. Arkansas’s History of Direct Democracy
Arkansas voters adopted initiative and popular referendum
provisions on September 5, 1910.96 Although the Arkansas
Populist Party used the initiative process as part of its platform in
1896, the movement did not succeed until George Donaghey
became Governor in 1909.97 Following his support, the
legislature approved Article 5 to the Arkansas Constitution.98 In
addition to legislative power being vested in the General
Assembly, power was now specifically reserved for the people
through citizen-led ballots concerning both constitutional
amendments and statutes.99 Amendment VII later altered Article
V in 1920,100 and beginning in 1925, initiatives were used to enact
92. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
93. See id. at 18-19.
94. Id. at 4.
95. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-9-107, -111(i) (2019).
96. History of Initiative and Referendum in Arkansas, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM
INST., [https://perma.cc/Q8WN-CUFK] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
97. Id.
98. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; History of Initiative and Referendum in Arkansas, supra
note 96.
99. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; History of Initiative and Referendum in Arkansas,
supra note 96.
100. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; History of Initiative and Referendum in Arkansas, supra
note 96.
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statewide laws. 101 Although legislators may also place initiatives
on the ballot, those stemming from the legislature have
historically received the same treatment as citizen-driven
initiatives.102
Arkansas has utilized the direct democracy process in a
variety of ways, such as limiting congressional salaries, requiring
Congress to use any constitutional means to block school
integration, abolishing the poll tax, and approving medical
marijuana.103 In addition to bypassing the legislature, Arkansans
bypass the Governor, which is true in any direct democracy
state.104 Since 1912, 139 measures have been presented to
Arkansas voters.105 Of those, sixty-four have passed and been
enacted into law, which is a forty-seven percent passage rate.106
When analyzing more recent initiatives, eighteen proposals
landed on the ballot between 1996 and 2018.107 Over those
twenty-two years, eleven initiatives were adopted, thus resulting
in a sixty-one percent passage rate. 108 In the November 2018
election, three measures appeared on Arkansas’s statewide
ballot.109 Of those measures, two were citizen-led while the other
was legislatively referred.110 The two citizen-led initiatives
sought to increase the state’s minimum wage and authorize four
casinos licenses, while the referred initiative sought increased
voter photo identification requirements.111 Arkansas voters
approved all three measures.112 The legislatively referred
initiative about voter identification was the most successful,

101. Sheppard, supra note 27, at 123.
102. Id. at 124.
103. WATERS, supra note 2, at 123-24; History of Initiative and Referendum in
Arkansas, supra note 96.
104. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; Sheppard, supra note 27, at 123-24.
105. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 124-31; Arkansas 2018 Ballot Measures,
BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/7F36-BFUJ] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
106. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 124-31; Arkansas 2018 Ballot Measures, supra
note 105.
107. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 130-31; Arkansas 2018 Ballot Measures, supra
note 105.
108. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 130-31; Arkansas 2018 Ballot Measures, supra
note 105.
109. Arkansas 2018 Ballot Measures, supra note 105.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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passing with 79.49 percent in favor of the requirement. 113 The
citizen-led initiatives increasing minimum wage and granting
casino gaming licenses passed with 68.45 percent and 54.1
percent, respectively.114
2. Arkansas’s Pre-Circulation Form Review
To begin the ballot initiative process in Arkansas, the
petitioner must file the correct documentation with the Secretary
of State at least four months before the statewide election.115
Under the Arkansas Constitution, the petition’s title is certified by
the Secretary of State.116 However, Amendment VII was codified
and Section 7-9-107 expanded upon Arkansas’s citizen
lawmaking process.117 While the codified version of Amendment
VII previously empowered the Attorney General to certify or
reject proposals, the General Assembly altered the statute on
March 8, 2019, with Act 376.118 In accordance with Article V of
the Constitution,119 the Arkansas Board of Election
Commissioners is now involved with determining the sufficiency
of initiative petitions.120 To start the process, petition sponsors
file an original draft of the initiative petition with the Secretary of
State.121 This draft must include the full text, ballot title, and
popular name of the proposed measure.122 The Secretary of State
then returns a file-marked copy of the petition to the sponsors,
which evidences that the draft was adequately filed.123 The
petition sponsor can now begin circulating the petition to gather
the number of signatures required for placement on a statewide
ballot.124 Thus, Arkansas’s pre-circulation review process merely
consists of a review for form.
113. Id.
114. Arkansas Ballot Issues in 2018, ARK.
[https://perma.cc/Y96L-XQM8] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
115. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
116. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
117. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107 (2019).
118. S.B. 346, 92d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019).
119. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111 (2019).
121. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107(a) (2019).
122. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107(b).
123. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107(c).
124. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107(d).
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3. Arkansas’s Post-Circulation Language Review
After circulation is complete, the petition sponsor resubmits
the petition to the Secretary of State for the sufficiency of the
signatures to be determined.125 While the Secretary of State
reviews the signatures, as of March 2019, he or she transfers
review of the petition language to the State Board of Election
Commissioners (“the Board”).126 The Board improves election
procedures by providing “education, assistance, and
monitoring.”127 This Board “assure[s] . . . consistent application
of voter registration laws and fair and orderly election
procedures.”128 The Board is comprised of the Secretary of State
and six individuals appointed by five separate offices.129 These
reviewers are experienced in the Arkansas voting process and
provide multiple viewpoints due to the Board’s unique formation.
Furthermore, only one of the seven Board members is a statewide
elected official,130 and thus, the review is less encumbered by reelection antics and other aspects coincidental to elected positions.
Upon receipt of a ballot proposal, the Board has thirty days to
certify or reject the petition’s title and popular name.131 The
Board certifies the petition to be placed on the ballot if it
determines that the petition presents the title, popular name, and
nature of the issue in a manner that:
is not misleading and not designed in such manner that a vote
“FOR” the issue would be a vote against the matter or
viewpoint that the voter believes himself or herself casting a
vote for, or, conversely, that a vote “AGAINST” an issue
would be a vote for a viewpoint that the voter is against. . .
.132

Additionally, the signatures must be determined
sufficient.133 Conversely, the Board can reject the petition and
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(a).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i).
127. About Us, ARK. ST. BD. OF ELECTION COMM’ RS, [https://perma.cc/36YD-J9AB]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
128. Rules, ARK. ST. BD. OF ELECTION COMM’RS, [https://perma.cc/6GBH-QRM6]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
129. About Us, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(2).
132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(3).
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(3).
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stop its placement on the ballot if those standards are not met.134
The initiative may simply be rejected, or the Board can provide
the sponsor with the reasons for the rejection.135 Either way, the
sponsor is unable to resubmit a redesigned initiative after
rejection.136 If the Board does not certify a proposed measure, the
petition sponsor or a registered voter may petition the Arkansas
Supreme Court to determine whether the title or popular name
deserves to be certified.137 Although the Supreme Court is
required to review the rejection expeditiously and make a
decision before the relevant election,138 the review is not required
to conclude before the election ballots are printed.139
4. The Problems with Arkansas’s Process
An Arkansas Attorney General once stated that “[t]he
permissible scope of the initiative . . . has no limits except as
stated in the provision granting the respective powers.”140 While
there is no limit on what initiatives can achieve, the Board has the
primary power to stop an initiative in its tracks. 141 Even though
the Secretary of State conducts a form-specific pre-circulation
review, the Board’s subject language review is only invoked after
petitioners spend time, energy, and resources circulating their
petitions and gathering thousands of signatures from across the
state.142 Due to the inequitable timing of this power, the
procedures governing initiatives must change to provide the direct
democracy intended by the Arkansas Constitution.143 The current
Arkansas Attorney General, Leslie Rutledge, recognizes that
there is a problem with the Arkansas initiative process. 144 Prior
to appearing in court for the lawsuit resulting from her continual
134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(4)(A)(i).
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(4)(A)(ii)(b).
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-112(a) (2019).
138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-112(b).
139. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-112(b).
140. Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-036 (1990).
141. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(4)(A).
142. Rutledge Calls on General Assembly to Fix Initiative Process, ATT’Y GEN.
LESLIE RUTLEDGE: NEWS RELEASES (May 17, 2018), [https://perma.cc/U624-9BPH]
[hereinafter Press Release 2018].
143. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 1061.
144. Press Release 2018, supra note 142.
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rejection of the casino ballot proposal in 2018, Rutledge
expressed hopes to work with the General Assembly “to ensure
Arkansans have a clear and fair process to have an initiative . . .
placed on the ballot.”145 Rather than having the Attorney General
make a decision that can later be rejected by the Arkansas
Supreme Court after an initiative is circulated, Rutledge
suggested the process be streamlined during the pre-circulation
review phase.146 While there is no Arkansas case law that gives
guidance to the Supreme Court’s review of the Board’s decision,
the previous review by the Attorney General did generate some
insight.147 Ultimately, however, both the old review process by
the Attorney General and the new review by the Board provide an
unclear standard. While the Arkansas process allows for citizen
authorship in addition to subsequent guidance by the reviewer,
the standard that guides the Board’s post-circulation review is
vague and open-ended because it allows for rejection if any
language may mislead or confuse voters.148
Because the post-circulation review standard is contingent
on voter confusion,149 the only criteria that matters for this review
is language. This model operates solely under a subjective test,
meaning that determinations are made according to personal
judgment.150 Reviewing an initiative’s language is important, and
states have a legitimate interest in ensuring that voters have a clear
understanding of what ballot measure they are supporting or
rejecting. However, such subjective tests give petitioners no clear
guide as to what secret sauce the reviewer is requiring for
145. Id.; see also John Moritz & Michael R. Wickline, Arkansas AG to Ask Legislators
to Fix Initiative System, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (May 18, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/D7WV-V2SR].
146. Moritz & Wickline, supra note 145.
147. When the Arkansas Supreme Court accepts a petition to review the Attorney
General’s decision, significance is given to the fact that the Attorney General approved it.
Fletcher v. Bryant, 243 Ark. 864, 867, 422 S.W.2d 698, 701 (1968). However, the Court
will not give the decision presumptive effect. Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 284, 884
S.W.2d 938, 942 (1994); Gaines v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 513, 519, 758 S.W.2d 403, 406 (1988).
Rather, the sufficiency of the ballot title and summary is a matter of law. Gaines, 296 Ark.
at 519, 758 S.W.2d at 406. The standard of review is a proposal that is intelligent, authentic,
and neutral. Ark. Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 466, 677 S.W.2d 846,
848 (1984).
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(4)(A) (2019).
149. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(4)(A).
150. Subjective Test, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/R7MP-U77L] (last
visited Nov. 9, 2018).
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certification. Furthermore, this substantive review takes place
after the petition is circulated, while the form-specific review is
the only evaluation beforehand.151
In accordance with the law at the time, three 2018 ballot
initiatives received Attorney General approval and Secretary of
State verification of gathered signatures.152 However, the
discretionary role given to the Attorney General during the precirculation review process made the path for these three initiatives
very complicated. The same will likely be true for future
language reviews by the Board, even though this will now be a
post-circulation review. In the 2018 election cycle alone, the
Attorney General rejected sixty-three proposed initiatives.153
Furthermore, the Attorney General rejected the minimum wage
measure three times in April 2018.154 Each submitted measure
varied, but all three consecutive proposals were nonetheless
rejected.155 In addition, the Attorney General rejected a casino
proposal for the fifth time in May 2018.156 The Board will have
this same ability, as they are the sole group to apply the
ambiguous confusing-language standard that allows for
rejections.157 As a result of this review structure, the perfect
formula to secure initiative certification in Arkansas is unclear,
especially after a petition is circulated. Therefore, all Arkansans
will benefit from a change in the mandate concerning the precirculation and post-circulation reviews.158
III. ANALYSIS
States can determine which pre-circulation review best
supports their goals by considering the relationship between the
pre-circulation model and type of reviewer. By considering the
reviewer’s amount of discretion, the reviewer’s source of
151. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107 (2019).
152. Arkansas 2018 Ballot Measures, supra note 105.
153. Ramsey, supra note 14.
154. Michael R. Wickline, Ballot Title for Measure Aimed at Increasing Arkansas’
Minimum Wage Fails Again, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (May 16, 2018, 4:30 AM),
[https://perma.cc/7LZB-F87S].
155. Id.
156. Ballot Title Still Faulty, State Attorney General Says in 5th Rejection of Casinos
Proposal, supra note 12.
157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(2)-(4)(A) (2019).
158. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 131-32.
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accountability, and the process’s level of efficiency, states are
able to conduct an informed evaluation of their direct democracy
processes.
A. The Two Pre-Circulation Review Models
Pre-circulation review centers on whether a ballot proposal
will be certified or rejected.159 That important decision rests on
whether the reviewer finds that the initiative passes the
constitutional or statutory standards concerning the initiative’s
subject or form.160
1. Rejection for Subject
Four states allow an official to reject an initiative due to its
failed adherence to a single subject rule or other issue
limitation.161 Examples of rejection based on subject deficiencies
include when: (1) the initiative encroaches on more than one area
of law;162 and (2) the initiative covers statutorily restricted
subjects. 163 While other states have subject limitations for
legislative bills,164 Florida and Oregon are among the only states
that employ the assessment during pre-circulation review.165
While large, financially powerful groups that push initiatives
likely have ample resources, an average voter suggesting an
initiative does not. As a result, composing a proposal that does
not concern more than one statutory or constitutional issue may
be challenging. This model gives the decision-maker much
discretion because the criteria examined is subject to the

159. See WATERS, supra note 2, at 18-20.
160. Id.
161. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 50-51; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
162. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 50-51; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. The Florida review is considered “very strict,” and
although it starts before circulation, the circulation often begins before the Supreme Court
makes a final determination. WATERS, supra note 2, at 295-96.
163. For example, while an initiative is rejected if it concerns the appropriation of
money, initiatives about new revenue provisions are allowed. MO. CONST. art. III, § 51.
164. See Ariz. Chamber of Commerce & Indus. v. Kiley, 399 P.3d 80, 88-89 (Ariz.
2017) (holding that the single-subject rule only applies to acts and not to initiative petitions).
165. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2; WATERS, supra note
2, at 18-19.
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reviewer’s personal analysis.166 If a reviewer construes a subject
limitation narrowly, any mention or combination of another
subject would be grounds for rejection.167 However, if a reviewer
construes the subject limitation to only apply in obvious cases of
an initiative encroaching on multiple or restricted areas, the
reviewer may approve more initiatives.168
2. Rejection for Form
Six states allow a public official, generally the Secretary of
State, to reject a ballot proposal for its form.169 This review
focuses solely on whether the technical drafting requirements are
satisfied, thus giving the decision-maker little to no discretion.170
Examples of rejection based on form deficiencies include
when: (1) the application has the correct contact information for
the proposal’s sponsors and includes the measure’s full text;171
and (2) the initiative complies with statutory guidelines. 172 The
majority of these states determine whether the initiative complies
with statutory guidelines; however, while some will disregard
clerical and technical errors,173 many strictly review initiatives.174
This review specifically contemplates the reality that a passed
initiative may overrule decisions made by the legislative body.175
This form-based review is an objective test, which means
there are right or wrong answers. Little to no ambiguity affects
this approach because the options are clear. An initiative either
meets the prescribed form requirements or it does not. A
reviewer’s opinion, judgment, or personal reaction to a proposal
166. See Daniel N. Boger, Constitutional Avoidance: The Single Subject Rule as an
Interpretive Principle, 103 VA. L. REV. 1247, 1291-92; WATERS, supra note 2, at 18-19.
167. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; see also WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
168. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 50-51; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
169. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-111.01(B) (2017); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 7-9-107 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161(2) (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
116.030-.040, .332 (2014) (requiring substantial compliance with the requirements, and
allowing the Missouri Attorney General to weigh in); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 9(B)
(2018).
170. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 116.030-.040; WATERS, supra note 2, at 18.
171. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. III, § 2.
172. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-101.01 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
101.161(2).
173. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 116.030-.040.
174. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 9(B), (D) (2018).
175. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-101.01.
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is irrelevant. This model lets the voters decide on the merits of
each initiative. Unlike the subject and confusing language
models, voters in form-review states are given the opportunity to
propose initiatives without fear of the reviewer’s discretionary
powers playing a role. As long as petitioners determine what the
form guidelines demand before submitting to the appropriate
authority, they have an idea of what constitutes rejection.
B. The Different Types of Reviewers
Whoever controls pre-circulation review determines
whether an initiative will have the opportunity to pass onto the
next step in the direct democracy process.176 The three types of
reviewers used to conduct pre-circulation review include elected
officials, appointed officials, and elected or appointed groups of
individuals.177
1. Elected Official
Six states empower an elected official to conduct a precirculation review of a proposed initiative.178 This reviewer is an
individual elected by the people to serve in an executive branch
position and whose duties involve important participation in the
ballot initiative process.179 In Arizona, Arkansas, and North
Dakota, the Secretary of State is the ultimate decision-maker in
initiative rejection.180 In Oregon and Oklahoma, the Attorney

176. See Mohs, supra note 8, at 296.
177. See id. at 302.
178. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107 (2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332 (2014);
Arizona Secretary of State, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/84PC-AXH2] (last visited Jan.
20, 2019); Attorney General of Oklahoma, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/9D7P-AQES]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2019); Attorney General of Oregon, BALLOTPEDIA,
[https://perma.cc/D2AN-ZGJT] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019); North Dakota Secretary of State,
BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/BZK2-4ECM] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
179. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107; MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332; Arizona Secretary
of State, supra note 178; Arkansas Secretary of State, BALLOTPEDIA,
[https://perma.cc/S3HC-NPC5] (last visited Sept. 4, 2019); Attorney General of Oklahoma,
supra note 178; Attorney General of Oregon, supra note 178; North Dakota Secretary of
State, supra note 178.
180. See Arizona Secretary of State, supra note 178; North Dakota Secretary of State,
supra note 178.
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General controls the review process.181 In Missouri, the Secretary
of State and Attorney General work together in reviewing the
initiative.182
Of the three types of reviewers, an elected official has the
highest level of accountability to the people.183 Because those
officials are only able to serve because of direct voter approval,
they are more likely to approve initiatives that their constituents
support.184 Because elected officials strive to keep their voters
satisfied, they may be more lenient during review if large and
powerful groups support the initiative. If officials are more
lenient during a review, more initiatives will make it on the ballot
and be placed in the hands of the voters. Furthermore, because
elected officials are more concerned with voter turnout, they will
be more likely to support popular initiatives.185 If a well-liked
initiative is placed on the ballot, more citizens will likely go to
the polls to ensure it passes.
2. Appointed Individuals
Florida is the only state that utilizes appointed individuals to
conduct pre-circulation reviews of proposed initiatives.186 These
reviewers direct the ballot initiative process and either reject or
approve initiatives as they are filed.187
In Florida, two appointed offices work together during the
pre-circulation review process.188 The Florida Supreme Court
reviews an initiative for adherence to the single-subject rule, and
the Secretary of State reviews an initiative for adherence to the
181. See Attorney General of Oklahoma, supra note 178; Attorney General of Oregon,
supra note 178.
182. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332. Once the Secretary of State receives a proposal, it is
sent to the Attorney General. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332(1). While the Attorney General
reviews it and either suggests initiative rejection or approval, the Secretary of State makes
the final decision. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332(4).
183. Burden, supra note 83, at 4.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Florida’s Court System, FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, [https://perma.cc/X9YSWP6Q] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019); Florida Secretary of State, BALLOTPEDIA,
[https://perma.cc/F5TD-YZ6F] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019); Laws Governing the Ballot
Initiative Process in Florida, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/X28B-WA3H] (last visited
Sept. 9, 2019).
187. Laws Governing the Ballot Initiative Process in Florida, supra note 186.
188. Id.
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required form.189 The Governor is involved in appointing the
Florida Supreme Court Justices and the Secretary of State.190
An appointed official has less accountability to voters.191
Because they are not chosen by the will of the people, they are
likely not as concerned with the voters’ opinions of their
actions.192 This insulation from voters plays a role in the amount
of potential bias initiatives may receive during the review process.
While any government actor hopefully strives to place the state
and its people first, an appointed official is subject to the
bureaucratic nature of appointments and all the expectations that
flow from them.
3. Group of Reviewers
Unlike the second type of reviewer, appointed individuals,
who independently conduct a pre-circulation review, a group may
instead conduct the review.193 Two states, Florida and Missouri,
empower more than one person to make pre-circulation review
decisions. 194 Instead of a sole authority rejecting an initiative, two
offices work together in guiding the direct democracy process.195
In some cases, while states may require petitioners to file an
initiative proposal with a sole officer like a secretary of state, that
officer does not play a role in the pre-circulation review process,
and thus the situation does not create a group review. 196 Instead,
189. Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161(2) (2014).
190. Florida Secretary of State, supra note 186; Florida’s Court System, supra note
186. When there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court, the Florida Governor appoints the next
justice from a list of qualified persons a nominating committee recommends. Florida’s
Court System, supra note 186. When a justice’s term expires, her name is then placed on the
general election ballot for a “merit retention vote.” Id. If the incumbent justice does not
earn enough votes, the Governor appoints another person to take the justice’s place. Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court is primarily an appointed body. Id.
191. Burden, supra note 83.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Laws Governing the Ballot Initiative Process in Florida, supra note 186;
MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332 (2014).
194. See Laws Governing the Ballot Initiative Process in Florida, supra note 186; MO.
ANN. STAT. § 116.332. While Arkansas does use the State Board of Election Commissioners
during a second review, which review only occurs after petitions are circulated. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 7-9-111 (2019).
195. See Laws Governing the Ballot Initiative Process in Florida, supra note 186; MO.
ANN. STAT. § 116.332 (2014).
196. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1. In Arkansas, a petitioner must file documents
with the Secretary of State at least four months before the statewide election. Id.
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that officer merely passes the initiative to another decisionmaker.197 Furthermore, while states may offer recourse options
following a rejected initiative,198 that remedy is not part of precirculation review and thus does not create a joint decisionmaking body.199
In Florida, the appointed and subsequently voter-approved
Supreme Court justices work with the appointed Secretary of
State during the review.200 The Supreme Court only participates
in the single subject review, while the Secretary of State only
participates in the form review.201 In Missouri, the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General both participate in reviewing the
initiative’s form.202 Both of those offices are filled during a
statewide general election.203
While Florida uses two appointed offices, and Missouri uses
two elected offices, both types show how pre-circulation review
models can avoid placing the discretionary authority in a single
decision-maker. Furthermore, five other states also utilize groups
to make pre-circulation review decisions.204 However, those
reviews are only advisory.205 In California, Colorado, and
Montana, a Legislative Council controls the review.206 The
Revisor of Statutes conducts the review in Nebraska, and the
Legislative Research Council conducts the review in South
Dakota.207 While the petitioners in those five states are not
required to heed any advice or verdicts resulting from the
review,208 the groups illustrate further examples of states turning
over pre-circulation review to a body of reviewers.
True joint participation during pre-circulation review is
beneficial because group decisions naturally impose checks and
197. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-111(i)(1) (2019). Once the Secretary of State
determines the sufficiency of the signatures, the ballot title and popular name are passed on
to the State Board of Election Commissioners to conduct a post-circulation review. Id.
198. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
199. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
200. Laws Governing the Ballot Initiative Process in Florida, supra note 186.
201. Id.
202. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.332 (2014).
203. MO. ANN. STAT. § 28.005 (1987); MO. ANN. STAT. § 27.010 (1987).
204. WATERS, supra note 2, at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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balances. People naturally seek advice when they have a strong
sense of accountability for their decisions.209 Because an
individual reviewer may seek advice on whether an initiative
meets the established criteria, implementing a multi-person
review group will solve this natural tendency. Group assessments
concerning decisions that are either correct or incorrect are
usually more accurate than an individual’s personal
assessment. 210 While a person’s opinions about an initiative may
stem from that individual’s established views and preferences,
utilizing a group of decision-makers forces each reviewer to
consider alternative views.211 Thus, pre-circulation reviews
conducted by more than one person lessens the possibility of a
single reviewer’s personal opinions affecting the outcome.
C. The Correlation between Review Model and Type of
Reviewer
Depending on the review model and the type of reviewer
used, the pre-circulation review process can achieve different
outcomes. In determining whether it is more or less likely that an
initiative will be certified, states should consider the reviewer’s
amount of discretion, the reviewer’s source of accountability, the
process’s level of efficiency, and the underlying equitable
principles.
1. How to Choose a Reviewer Based on Model Used
If the subject review model is used, states should empower
elected officials to conduct the pre-circulation review because
such a subjective test relies on the reviewer’s personal judgment.
Because of the high accountability to voters, an official will likely
serve the people, and not his own agenda, first. Whether that
means that he will be more lenient during the subjective review
or that he will follow the statutory guidelines more closely to
avoid suggestions of bias, using an elected official lessens the
possibility that an abuse of power will occur. Alternatively, states
209. Ilan Yaniv, The Benefit of Additional Opinions, 13 AM. PSYCHOL. SOC’Y 75, 75
(2004).
210. Id. at 76.
211. Id. at 77.
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could empower group decision-makers to conduct a subject
review. By having more people participate in reviews with no
clear answers, states give reviewers fewer opportunities to rely on
their own opinions instead of the statutory guidelines. Thus, a
team of reviewers minimizes the risk that the review is tainted by
the unlimited discretion usually afforded to a sole initiative
reviewer.
However, a state should avoid allowing an appointed official
to conduct pre-circulation reviews when a subject restriction is
the criterion. Because an appointed reviewer’s source of
accountability stems from whoever made him the reviewer, he is
more likely to follow that person’s agenda. Consequently, an
appointed reviewer may include both his personal biases and
those of his appointer in his pre-circulation review decisions. If
a state wants the governor to appoint an individual, and the
governor’s agenda greatly differs from a popular initiative
proposal, the appointee may abuse his discretion and reject an
initiative for the wrong reasons. Due to the large deference
provided to the subject reviewer during the pre-circulation phase,
the risk that the review will be tainted is especially high with an
appointed reviewer.
If the form review model is used, states can utilize any type
of reviewer. The form review offers the reviewer little
discretionary power due to its rigid nature. As a result, neither an
elected or appointed individual nor a group of reviewers
endangers the pre-circulation review process. No matter the type
used, the reviewer or reviewers would not have enough flexibility
for personal considerations or sources of accountability to impact
the final decision.
2. The Compromise between Equity and Efficiency
Equity is the driving principle of pre-circulation review, but
the trade-off is the process’s efficiency. Something is equitable
when it “deal[s] fairly and equally with all concerned.”212 When
appointed or elected individuals conduct reviews, the equitable
nature of the process suffers. Because the reviewer’s constraints
stem from the applicable statutory language only, the reviewer is
212. Equitable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020).
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not forced to consider the entirety of the initiative, which is
especially important when the reviewer has discretionary power.
However, reviews managed by an elected or appointed individual
are likely the most efficient. With a single person having full
power to reject or accept an initiative, the initiative’s petitioners
will only be awaiting that one person’s decision. While a sole
reviewer may drag out the process by refusing to certify or deny
initiatives, states can avoid this potential problem by allowing
reviewers a limited number of days to make a decision. Thus, the
decision will likely be announced sooner, and petitioners will
have more time to submit an altered version of the initiative
proposal before the deadline passes.
On the other hand, with a group pre-circulation review, the
process is likely fairer and more equitable. The more people that
participate in the review, the more opinions are taken into
consideration when deciding to accept or reject an initiative.
Unfortunately, efficiency declines with a multi-person review
because the more people that are involved, the longer it may take
to reach a decision. Furthermore, if the chosen review model
gives the group wide discretion, then the process will be even less
efficient because there will be no detailed standard to follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the combination of review model and who conducts
the review affects the pre-circulation review process, states
should consider the consequences associated with each
combination to improve their pre-circulation review processes.
All states, specifically Arkansas, should employ a pre-circulation
review that truly represents the promise of citizen lawmaking.
A. Assessing a Pre-Circulation Review
While remedies often exist when a pre-circulation review
results in initiative rejection,213 those remedies are not enough. A
binding petition review is the most important step in the direct
democracy process because it determines whether an initiative
213. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art V, § 1. Available remedies in Arkansas include
modification of the initiative by the authorized public official or judicial review for
certification denial. Id.
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has any chance of making it on the ballot. The subject approach
concentrates on the initiative’s composition, but the reviewer has
full discretion to interpret the restrictions either narrowly or
broadly. The form-specific approach focuses only on the
proposal’s technical structure but allows even poorly worded or
confusing initiatives to reach voters. While both of these review
approaches are beneficial because they safeguard direct
democracy essentials, one type is not more equitable than the
other. Rather, states can assess their pre-circulation reviews by
considering how much discretion they wish to give the reviewer,
what they want to review for, and what type of reviewer
implications best fits their needs. Through contemplating the
ramifications of each aspect of the review process, states can each
create their ideal pre-circulation review and ensure that their
processes are fair and equitable for all.
B. The Solution for Arkansas
Because the Secretary of State’s pre-circulation review is
limited to form while the State Board of Election Commissioners
conduct a post-circulation language review, the Arkansas ballot
initiative process will benefit from change. Various government
officials recognize the need for reform.214 However, the Arkansas
legislature may avoid making changes to the governing statute
that make it any easier for citizens to pass initiatives without
legislative support or guidance. As Arkansas is primarily known
as a conservative state, recently passed ballot initiatives, such as
the medical marijuana bill,215 would likely not have become law
if direct democracy was not available. No matter if ballot
initiative reform is channeled through the Arkansas legislature in
the form of a constitutional amendment referral or directly
through a citizen ballot initiative, further reform is necessary to
give all Arkansans a clear understanding of their right to direct
democracy.

214. See, e.g., Press Release 2018, supra note 144. In 2019, two bills were introduced
that would alter, through a constitutional amendment, who conducts pre-circulation review
and the corresponding signature and timeline requirements. See generally H.R. 1489, 92d
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019); H.R.J. Res. 1023, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2019).
215. ARK. CONST. amend. XCVIII, § 3.
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First, the process should still include a mandatory precirculation review that is binding on the initiative’s petitioners.
However, full initiative certification or rejection should take place
before signatures are gathered due to the time and resources
necessary to meet the circulation requirements. Waiting until
after signatures are gathered to learn whether an initiative passes
certification unnecessarily impedes the process at the expense of
petitioners. Thus, when the Secretary of State conducts the form
review, the State Board of Election Commissioners should also
conduct the language review. Even though the language-centered
approach provides no clear rubric for reviewers to follow,
implementing both a form and language pre-circulation review
will ensure that all initiatives that eventually land on the statewide
ballot are adequate and well-developed.
If the Board is unable to adequately conduct a language precirculation review, a selected group of public officers could
instead be used to improve the pre-circulation review process.
This group could include the Secretary of State, one
Commissioner from the Board, and the Chief Justice of the
Arkansas Supreme Court. Because two reviewers are elected
officials, while one is appointed, they will be attuned to voters’
wishes and understand the importance of following established
guidelines to avoid backlash. The Secretary of State oversees
elections and is already tasked with receiving all ballot initiative
proposals, so the position naturally fits into the review group.216
As the Board already guides the review process, keeping that
assignment for one individual Commissioner will reduce any
problems that often follow new organization. While the entire
Supreme Court conducts a review upon request after initiative
certification and signature gathering,217 including the Chief
Justice in the initial certification review will bring that same
perspective earlier in the process. If the decision is appealed to
the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice will simply recuse him or
herself. By utilizing either the Board of Election Commissioners
or the described combination of elected and appointed officials,
pre-circulation review decisions will inevitably be fairer and more
impartial, no matter a proposal’s subject area.

216. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
217. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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By incorporating these changes, the review ambiguity and
unbalanced discretionary power within the Arkansas process will
be lessened. Future ballot initiative petitioners will not have to
guess the secret sauce needed for ballot certification. Rather,
petitioners will be able to identify exactly what is required to pass
review and thus utilize the direct democracy system they are
guaranteed.

